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 Bankia was the institution that received the largest chunk of 
the international financial aid package that was granted to 
Spain, as it posted a EUR 19 bn net loss on 2012. 
 With the implementation of the Restructuring Plan, the bank 
managed to boost operational efficiency, but some non-core 
investments still need to be disposed. There is not great 
expectation that this activity will yield significant cash flow for 
Bankia. 
 Reached a time when the Balance Sheet is cleaned of all 
assets to be divested, Bankia’s value driving component is 
expected to be the Net Interest Income. 
 Net Interest Income is pressured by the fall in yields that is 
expected to continue for some more 4-5 years, as long as the 
ECB maintains its Quantitative Easing program. 
 Bankia plans to increase the share of Corporate & SME loans 
in its Loan Portfolio, in a manoeuvre to capture higher interest 
income as a result of higher rates. 
 The plan is contingent, however, to the recovery of the 
market of lending to Corporate & SME clients, one of the 
segments most hit during the financial crisis. 
 Significant losses related to Sareb bonds are a risk that can 
materialize in the future.  
 
Company Description 
Bankia is a Spanish commercial bank operating in national 
territory, offering traditional banking products. In 2012 it was 
nationalised by the Spanish State to dodge bankruptcy.  
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(Values in € millions) 2014 2015E 2016F 
Net interest Income 2,927 2,318 2,229 
Gross Income 4,008 3,392 3,327 
Net Income (Before 
Dividends) 
771 490 952 
Cost to Income 43.5% 52.2% 53.2% 
NPL ratio 12.9% 12.8% 12.9% 
Loans to Deposits 74.8% 79.0% 84.4% 
ROE 6.5% 4.0% 7.9% 
ROA 0.3% 0.2% 0.4% 
EPS 0.070 0.043 0.083 
P/E (recurrent)* 13.17 12.19 11.44 
Source:Company Data and Analyst’s Estimates 
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Born as a result of the merger of seven cajas de ahorros (savings banks), Bankia 
now stands as a major player in the Spanish Banking sector, being the 4th largest 
commercial bank by market capitalization.  
Where it all began  
The year was 2010 and the Spanish ailing Real Estate market continued to 
deteriorate the quality of the assets of the country’s banks. Since the turn of the 
century, Spain enjoyed a bull run on house prices, with the price per square meter 
increasing 136% (11.32% CAGR) up until 2008 end, to reach EUR 2,018, 
prompting overinvestment. Helped by the ever increasing collateral valuations, the 
amount of Credit destined to House Purchases soared 335% from 2000 to 2008 
(a 20.19% CAGR). However, 2008 served as the turning point on the lending 
behaviour of banks, as non-performing loans on this segment started to be more 
and more expressive (sharp increase in the Non-Performing Loans – NPL – ratio 
from 0.71% in year end 2007 to 3.00% in mid 2009). The worldwide financial crisis 
started to take its toll on the Spanish economy: the unemployment rate more than 
doubled from 2007 to 2010 (8.80% to 20.30%), contributing to increasing non-
performing loan volumes. This behaviour was also present in the Corporate & SME 
loan market, more specifically with Construction and Real Estate segments where 
total loan volumes increased at a CAGR of 28.42% in the years from 2000 to 2008 
(total increase of 640%), while enjoying NPL ratios close to 1% on average. From 
2008 to 2010 this loan volume contracted 8.42% and the NPL ratio increased from 
5.72% in year end 2008 to 13.48% in year end 2010.  
House prices suffered a contraction starting on 2008 (by 2010 year end they had 
decreased 9.56%), which lowered the market value of collateralized loans, 
pressuring banks’ capital adequacy. Despite the systematic nature of the financial 
crisis, not all institutions were equally affected. The greatest victims of the 
economic turmoil were the savings banks, triggering a large round of consolidation 
in the sector. On the wake of this situation, the Spanish Government created in 
2009 the Fondo de Reestructuración Ordenada Bancaria (FROB) as a vehicle 
dedicated to assist financial institutions in their capital needs. 
As a result of the sector’s consolidation, in 2010, the Banco Financiero y de 
Ahorros (BFA) was created joining the balance sheets of 7 savings banks: 
Cajamadrid, Bancaja, Caja Insular, Caja de Ávila, Caja Laietana, Caja Segovia, 
and Caja Rioja, which would become BFA’s shareholders. As part of the 

















Figure 2: Loans and NPL Ratio for House 
Purchase in Spain, EUR bn
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Figure 4 - House prices in Spain (EUR/sqm)
Source: Bank of Spain 
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shares subscribed by the FROB. Bankia was created as a fully owned subsidiary 
of BFA, to hold the greatest part (85%) of the assets and liabilities of the seven 
cajas de ahorros.  
In 2011 the Bank of Spain issued a stricter set of minimum capital requirements to 
be complied by financial institutions. In order to comply with the “capital principal” 
ratio of 8%, Bankia went public on July 2011, raising EUR 3.09 bn from private 
investors, the value paid for 47.6% of the capital. BFA was left with the remaining 
52.4%. 
As the Bank of Spain revised its guidance for the provisions of non-performing real 
estate assets, the FROB converted its hybrid securities in BFA to capital (resulting 
in the FROB being the sole shareholder of BFA, and consequently having a 
controlling stake in Bankia). Still, the bank struggled to keep up with the 
increasingly demanding regulatory landscape, presenting negative earnings 
throughout the financial disclosures of 2012, fuelled by impairment losses in 
financial assets. 
In July of 2012 Spain requested the European Commission for assistance in its 
efforts to improve the health of the Spanish financial system. The agreement led 
to the creation of an asset management company (Sareb) to strip the balance 
sheets off of the state intervened institutions of non-performing assets, serving as 
a “bad bank”. Also, system wide and institution specific stress tests were 
conducted by an independent company, the results of which confirmed Bankia’s 
frailties: it was the analysed institution with the highest capital needs in the base 
scenario (EUR 13.2 bn) and also in the adverse scenario (EUR 24.7 bn). 
As a consequence of this result, further public assistance was conceded to Bankia. 
First, FROB contributed with a EUR 4.5 bn capital increase in BFA, which was 
transmitted to Bankia in the form of a subordinated loan, eligible as Tier II capital. 
Second, FROB increased its capital investment in BFA through the subscription of 
ordinary shares worth around EUR 13.5 bn, in exchange for bonds issued by the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM). BFA transferred the ESM bonds to Bankia 
as an exchange for contingent convertible (CoCo) bonds issued by Bankia, eligible 
as “capital principal” in the regulatory framework. Also, BFA/Bankia transferred a 
share of its assets exposed to the real estate sector to Sareb, amounting to EUR 
22.3 bn (the portion related to Bankia was EUR 19.4 bn), receiving in exchange 
bonds issued by the Sareb and guaranteed by the Spanish State.  
As part of the public and international aid received, BFA/Bankia was required to 
comply with a Restructuring Plan set out to monitor the usage of the funds awarded 
to the bank, and guaranteeing that Bankia is able to meet the commitments 
Figure 5 – BFA’s original Shareholder 
Structure 









Figure 6 – Summary of State aid to BFA/Bankia 
Source: European Commission 
Figure 7 – State aid to other banks 
Source: FROB 
Description Date Value (EUR bn)
FROB subscribes 
preferrence shares in BFA
Jun 2010 4.465
FROB subscribes ordinary 
shares in BFA
Sep 2012 4.50




Institution Value (EUR mm)
Catalunya Banc 9,048
Nova Caixa Galicia 5,425
Banco de Valencia 4,500




























assumed with its creditors and investors by 2017. For the period 2012-2015, a 
Strategic Plan was implemented in accordance with the Restructuring Plan. During 
this period, BFA/Bankia pursued a divestment plan, shedding non-core assets 
such as City National Bank of Florida sold in October 2015 (yielding a net gain of 
EUR 117 mm); it scaled back its operations by reducing its branch network from 
3,083 in December 2012 to 1,974 in September 2015 (36% decrease, in line with 
what was set out in the plan); it reduced the number of employees from 20,005 in 
year end 2012 to 14,042 (a 29.8% decrease, also in line with the plan). The 
segmentation of the Loan Portfolio was also planned, with the objective of 
increasing the share of lending to Corporate & SME and seeking to reduce the 
exposure to the Real Estate sector to zero. The prevision was to generate EUR 52 
bn of new loans by 2015, 84% of which to be allocated to Corporate & SME. 
The troubled path of Bankia since its inception, being by the nature of its assets 
arising from institutions hit the most in the financial crisis, being by corporate 
governance alleged irregularities (the case of ex-executive chairman Rodrigo 
Rato) contributed for a bad performance in the financial markets, offering an 
annualized return of -56.87% since its market flotation (on adjusted terms for the 
2013 reverse stock split). 
Business description 
Bankia operates throughout Spain, having a strong presence in the Madrid and 
Valencia areas (corresponding to the former biggest shareholders, Cajamadrid 
and Bancaja). It follows the business model of a traditional commercial bank, 
offering services to both retail and business clients. On year end 2014, Bankia held 
a market share of 8.4% in deposits from Spanish residents (excluding the 
Government and Credit Institutions) and also an 8.4% market share on the total 
amount of gross loans in the Spanish financial system (excluding Credit 
Institutions). 
Retail Banking 
The Retail segment is the business where Bankia has the most customers (72.13% 
in 2014). The range of services offered to retail clients includes deposit accounts 
(sight deposits, term deposits and savings accounts), loans (mortgages and 
general consumer credit) and others including credit cards and insurance, through 
a partnership with Mapfre. It also offers asset management and investment 





















Figure 11 - Bankia's Customer 
Segmentation, 2014
Private Banking Personal Banking
Preferential Management SMEs and Micro Entreprises
Retail Costumers








Figure 9 - Bankia's number of employees 
evolution
Source: Company Data 
 
 









Bankia holds a strong presence in the business segment, counting with around 
20,000 customers in its client portfolio, representing about 34.8% of the total clients 
in the Spanish market. The Restructuring Plan sets out the objective to increase 
the weight of the business lending, and as such, in 2013 the bank launched a plan 
focused on SME lending with the objective of having EUR 43.5 bn in new loans by 
2015. As of September 2015, 75.63% of this objective was met, with new loans to 
businesses amounting to EUR 32.9 bn since 2013. 
In 2014, Bankia created a new credit line targeting SMEs with a reduced funding 
cost. The “Prestamo Dinamización” resulted from the cheaper funding for the bank 
from the ECB through a TLTRO facility, which decreased the cost of lending to the 
clients in about 30%. From the EUR 2.78 bn awarded to Bankia, EUR 1.39 bn were 
already granted to clients by year end 2014. 
Shareholder structure 
Bankia’s majority shareholder as of 2014 end was BFA with 62.21% of the share 
capital. The remainder of the capital is held by private and institutional investors, 
traded on the stock exchanges of Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia and Bilbao. 
As part of the Restructuring Plan accorded with the European Commission, BFA 
ceased to be a credit institution starting January 2014. 
As a consequence of the conversion of the preferred convertible shares held by 
the FROB in the first outlay of public assistance given to BFA, BFA’s capital 
became 100% property of the FROB, leaving the previous shareholders (the seven 
cajas de ahorros) out of the shareholder structure. As the FROB is a public 
mechanism, the ultimate owner of Bankia is the Spanish state. 
Bankia did not distribute any dividends in the years from 2011 to 2014. However, 
in 2015 the governing bodies of Bankia approved a dividend distribution of EUR 
201.6 mm. 
Bankia’s Operations 
Bankia’s income sources are in their majority the Loan and the Bond Portfolios. 
The Loan Portfolio 
It is possible to segment the loan offer (to non-financial counterparts) of Bankia 
into 4 different types of lines: House Purchase (referenced interchangeably as 
Mortgages), Corporate & SME, Consumer Loans and Government & Other. At its 
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Figure 14 - Bankia's Loan Portfolio 
evolution, EUR bn (net loans)
Mortgages Corporate & SME
Consumer Loans Government & Other
54.00% 57.53% 61.63% 61.50%
38.86% 33.31% 31.24% 30.59%
3.01% 1.61% 1.83% 1.97%
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Figure 15 - Bankia's Loan Portfolio 
segmentation (net loans)
Mortgages Corporate & SME
Consumer Loans Government & Other
Source: Company Data 
Source: Company Data, Analyst’s 
estimates 









Figure 12 - Bankia's new Business Lending 
(EUR mm)
Source: Company Data 
*Bankia did not disclose the 2013 figures 
quarterly. The whole year of 2013 is presented 
 
 








of its EUR 181.11 bn of Loan Portfolio carrying value, followed by Corporate & SME 
with a share of 38.86%.  
The line of Consumer Loans is the one that bears the highest NPL ratios 
(estimated2 63.89% in 2014 year-end). Bankia has been decreasing its exposure 
to these assets, from a carrying amount of EUR 5.46 bn in 2011 to EUR 2.22 bn 
in 2014 (a 59.34% contraction). The decrease in the balance sheet amount of this 
item should benefit the bank, and a future increase is not expected, as Bankia 
shifts its lending activities efforts to target the Corporate & SME clients.  
Although the guidance from the company (since 2012) is to shift the weight of the 
Loan Portfolio to the Corporate & SME segment, Bankia is having difficulties in the 
attainment of this objective, with the share of Corporate & SME lowering to 30.59% 
in 2014, from 33.31% in 2012. 
First the Spanish credit market for Corporate & SME behaved very differently from 
the House Purchasing credit market one in the period 2012-2014. The latter 
contracted from EUR 605 bn in 2012 to EUR 558 bn in year end 2014 (a 7.78% 
contraction) while the former stood at EUR 830 bn in year end 2012 contrasting 
with the value of EUR 674 bn for December 2014 (an 18.76% contraction). So, the 
evolution of the Spanish credit market saw the Corporate & SME segment shrink 
at a faster rate than the credit volumes destined to House Purchase by households, 
negatively impacting Bankia’s ability to increase its business credit portfolio, as it 
would need to significantly improve its market share in this segment in order to 
meet its credit refocusing strategy (the market share of Bankia in the Corporate & 
SME, in a gross loan basis, gravitated around 6% in the years between 2012 and 
2014).  
Second, for each 100 euros of loans conceded by Bankia for Corporate & SME 
that were still in the bank’s books by 2014 end, an estimated 15.37 euros were 
provisioned for impairment losses. In contrast, the House Purchase segment has 
an impairment provision to gross loans ratio of 1.16%. This is mainly the 
consequence of a consistently significantly higher NPL and NPL coverage ratios 
for the Corporate & SME segment in comparison with the House Purchase 
segment. 
Also, when in 2012 the transfer of eligible real estate assets to Sareb was 
completed, the Corporate & SME loan book suffered the biggest decline out of all 
the segments, some 46.10% corresponding to a loss of carrying value of an 
estimated EUR 38.2 bn, while the Mortgage segment only fell by 9.50%, 
                                                 
1 Disclosed value is EUR 182.6 bn, but an approximation is used so as to segment in the mentioned lines. 
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Figure 16 - Bankia's selected NPL Ratios
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FIgure 17 - Bankia's selected NPL Coverage 
Ratios
Total NPL Coverage Ratio
Mortgages NPL Coverage Ratio
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Figure 18 - Sareb asset transfer 
composition, EUR bn
Real Estate and Construction Loans
Other Real Estate Assets
Source: Company Data 
 
 








representing EUR 8.1 bn. This fall explains the biggest loss of Corporate & SME 
share in the total Loan Portfolio, contracting from 2011 to 2012 (38.86% to 
33.31%). 
In comparison with the whole Spanish market, Bankia’s doubtful assets related to 
the Loan Portfolio are higher in value in relative terms, being the Corporate & SME 
line the most relevant example, for its weight in Bankia’s credit assets.  
 
The Bond Portfolio 
Besides its lending activity to households and businesses, Bankia also holds a 
portfolio of bonds that constitute a major source of interest income (around 45% in 
2014). The Bond Portfolio in 2014 amounted to EUR 63 bn (27% of assets) and 
can be segmented in 4 different bond types3. 
ALCO Bonds 
The ALCO Bonds represent the biggest share of the portfolio (46.6% in 2014). The 
purpose of these bonds is to manage Asset-Liability discrepancies in maturities 
and interest rates. The portfolio is composed in its majority by European sovereign 
debt, majorly Spanish. These bonds, being actively traded securities positively 
contribute to Bankia’s liquidity position. A major setback on these securities is, 
however, the consistent fall in yields of European government debt, raising 
reinvestment risk and pressuring Net Interest Income.  
Sareb Bonds 
In 2012 Bankia transferred to Sareb its eligible Real Estate non-performing assets 
as part of the Restructuring Plan. In exchange, Sareb issued 3 bonds with 
maturities of one, two and three years, with a roll over option (exercisable by 
Sareb) at the end of the maturities, for a total amount of EUR 19.47 bn. The bonds 
yield interest on a variable basis, being composed by the 3 month Euribor and a 
spread for each different maturity. On 2013, Sareb redeemed an estimated EUR 
                                                 
3 Bankia does not directly disclose the composition of the Bond Portfolio in the used segmentation. The values for each 
of the types are estimations based on the company’s disclosures. 
Figure 19 - Comparison of Bankia's and Spain's NPL Ratios
NPL Ratio Bankia Spain Bankia Spain Bankia Spain Bankia Spain
Mortgages 2.47% 2.90% 4.00% 3.97% 4.25% 5.96% 3.73% 5.85%
Corporate & SME 12.36% 11.32% 23.24% 15.48% 27.72% 20.31% 25.07% 18.49%
Consumer Loans 33.35% 6.97% 68.71% 9.55% 71.94% 11.97% 63.89% 11.39%
Government & Other 2.01% 0.52% 1.91% 0.51% 3.09% 0.93% 2.41% 0.82%
Source: Company Data, Bank of Spain, Analyst's estimates






Figure 20 - Bankia's Bond Portfolio 
composition in 2014, EUR bn
ALCO Bonds SAREB Bonds
Non ALCO Bonds ESM Bonds
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Figure 21 - Bankia's ALCO Portfolio 
evolution, EUR bn












882 mm of these bonds in cash, conducting another cash redemption on 2014, 
worth EUR 528 mm.  
Cash redemptions accounted for only 8.84% of the nominal amount of bonds that 
matured up to 2014. Sareb paid the rest of the amount using the roll over options, 
by issuing new bonds with the same maturities as the bonds that are being rolled 
over.  
Whenever a roll over option is exercised, the spreads can be renegotiated. In an 
environment of low interest rates, this renegotiation poses a threat to Bankia, as it 
incurs the risk of receiving new bonds yielding lower interest income. In fact, as 
figure 23 shows, the spreads on the rolled over securities have been significantly 
cut corresponding to losses in interest income of around EUR 105 mm in the bonds 
with maturity of one year and EUR 178 mm in the bonds with two year maturity. 
Given Sareb’s activity being the disposal of non-performing assets, it is expected 
that its cash generating capabilities are not sufficient to level up the cash 
redemptions of these bonds, leaving Bankia with increasingly pressured Net 
Interest Income in the low rates environment. If the trend materializes in 2015, the 




Bankia received bonds from the European Stability Mechanism as payment for the 
capital increase the FROB subscribed in BFA. The bonds correspond to 4 out of 
the 5 different credit lines as set out by the ESM for the financial aid of the Spanish 
banking system4. 
Each bond carries a different maturity and interest rate. As of 2014, Bankia had 
EUR 4.17 bn worth of these bonds in its balance sheet in comparison with the EUR 
13.5 bn it was awarded in 2012 (the remaining bond matures in December 2015, 
the other 3 matured during 2013 and 2014). The maturity of the EUR 4.17 bn of 
the remaining active bond in year end 2015 will not result in a loss of interest 
income, as the interest rate on this bond is calculated as the 6 month Euribor (-
                                                 
4 ESM release No 03/2012 of 5 December 2012 

















Sareb 1y 5,840,100 2.19% 2.86% 5,575,500 0.69% 1.26% 5,555,800 0.30% 0.45%
Sareb 2y 8,760,300 2.56% 3.51% 8,363,300 2.56% 1.86% 8,333,800 0.43% 0.64%




Sareb 1y 265 20
Sareb 2y 397 30
Sareb 3y 221 479
Total 882 528
Source: Company Data, Analyst’s 
estimates 































































0.024% as of 20/11/2015) minus a spread of 6 basis points. As such, the maturity 
of this bond comes as good news, as it would yield negative interest. 
Non-ALCO Bonds and other 
The remaining components of the Bond Portfolio are legacy securities registered 
as “Held to Maturity Investments”. It comprises both resident and non-resident 




Deposits are the main funding source for Bankia’s operations, representing 
71.59% of total assets in 2014. The composition of the Deposits, however, has not 
been constant throughout Bankia’s lifetime: repo transactions that are registered 
under deposits suffered a great decline from year end 2011 to 2012, cutting 
Bankia’s funding by EUR 33.4 bn, heightening the difficulties in Bankia’s ability to 
show its assets quality, as the repo slowdown suggests counterparties’ rejection 
of Bankia’s collateral for the funding. Also, the combined variations of current 
accounts, savings accounts and term deposits (that represented the majority 
source of funds in 2012 in the Deposits’ segment, with a 56.62% share) suffered a 
decrease of EUR 19.1 bn. To compensate the funding shortage, the Bank of Spain 
increased its deposits in Bankia by EUR 29.5 bn (a 131.6% increase) in 2012. 
Despite the contribution for the Bank of Spain, the almost shutdown of the repo 
transactions combined with the bank run on deposits resulted in a decrease of the 
total amount of Deposits to EUR 188.9 bn in 2012 from EUR 206.2 bn in 2011 (an 
8.39% contraction).  
Also, Deposits from Credit Institutions mark a stable presence in the balance sheet 
of Bankia, with the total amount of funding captured by Bankia from these agents 
not varying considerably in the years spanning 2011-2014.  
As of December 2014, Bankia’s Deposits structure was still composed at its 
majority by Customer Deposits (63.8%) and the Deposits from Central Banks have 
been experiencing a reduction, with their value on the first half of 2015 being EUR 
26.7 bn, a reduction of 48.7% since the year end 2012 value. 
Debt 
Bankia’s Debt Securities are arranged into “Marketable Debt Securities” and 
“Subordinated Liabilities”.  
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Figure 26 - Bankia's Deposit Costs
Deposits from Central Banks
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Figure 27 - Bankia's composition of 
Customer Deposits, EUR bn
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Figure 25 - Bankia's composition of 
Deposits, EUR bn
Repos & Other Accounts
Deposits from Credit Institutions
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Marketable Debt Securities are debt issuances that transited from the seven 
founding cajas own balance sheets, comprising regular senior debt and mortgage 
backed securities. On December 2011, when these securities were first registered 
in the annual consolidated accounts of Bankia, the gross amount in issue was EUR 
63.3 bn (out of which EUR 39.1 bn were mortgage backed securities), which 
corresponded to a carrying amount of EUR 47.6 bn after adjusting for debt 
repurchases (Bankia is following a plan to repurchase certain mortgage covered 
issuances to optimize its funding structure) and other adjustments.  
2014 was the year that Bankia returned to the capital markets, issuing in January 
EUR 1 bn worth of senior unsecured bonds, yielding an annual coupon of 3.5% 
and maturing in 2019. Throughout 2014 Bankia was able to tap the capital markets 
to raise more debt, the case of 20 new bonds (Bankia ICO Bonds) totalling EUR 
194.58 mm variable rate bonds (average spread of 2% over the six month Euribor) 
with maturities spanning from 2 years to 6 years. Also in 2014 Bankia issued EUR 
7.5 bn of mortgage covered debt. 
As for 2015 year to date, Bankia issued EUR 2.25 bn of mortgage covered bonds. 
Regarding senior unsecured debt, Bankia raised on October 2015 a EUR 125.3 
mm bond maturing in 2017 and paying an interest of 1.5%. 
As for the Subordinated Liabilities, also a residual amount of liabilities were 
transferred from the cajas. The drastic increase from EUR 318 mm in 2011 to EUR 
15.6 bn is due to the subordinated loan subscribed by BFA as part of the 
recapitalization of BFA dating September 2012 (EUR 4.5 bn) and to the CoCo 
bonds subscribed by BFA (EUR 10.7 bn). As the subordinated loan was fully repaid 
and the CoCo bonds converted to capital, by 2013 there were no Subordinated 
Liabilities in Bankia’s balance sheet. Only in 2014 Bankia issued EUR 1 bn worth 
of subordinated notes, at a fixed rate of 4%. 
Bankia’s newfound ability to finance itself in the capital markets in 2014 provides 
good sentiment on the ability to fulfil its liabilities, which suggests that any liquidity 
shortage for debt repayment or other urgent purpose can be countered, while 
rolling over debt at lower rates (assuming the low yield environment is maintained). 
The Banking Sector 
After a period of economic hardship followed by the global financial crisis that 
struck in 2008, the Eurozone starts to show signs of recovery. Real GDP has been 
growing at a modest pace in 2015 (average QoQ growth rates for the first three 
quarters is 0.4%) with domestic consumption improvement being one of the main 









Figure 30 - Bankia's Debt repayment 
schedule (senior), EUR mm


















































































Figure 31 - Bankia's senior bond yield (1bn 
issue of 2014)







Figure 32 - Bankia's subordinated bond yield 
(1bn issue of 2014)
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Figure 29 - Bankia's Marketable Debt 
Securities' cost












close to zero, way out of the ECB’s around 2% target. As a response to these 
levels of inflation, the ECB started its own Quantitative Easing (QE) program in 
October 2014. It has since established the objective of buying a monthly amount 
worth EUR 60 bn of eligible debt securities in an attempt to improve financial 
liquidity that can be channelled to the real economy. 
This situation in Europe contrasts with the USA that ended its QE program and 
raised reference rates in December 2015 for the first time since 2009. The 
differences in policy are expected to strengthen the USD, as investment flows to 
American securities.  
On November 2015, the European Banking Authority (EBA) disclosed the results 
of its European Union wide transparency tests. The observed landscape was of a 
better capitalized financial system, with the system’s Common Equity Tier 1 (CET 
1) ratio clocking at 12.6%, representing a 5.6% margin over the to be fully 
implemented minimum requirements of Basel 3 (in 2019). The remaining capital 
ratios are also above the regulatory minima. This stronger capital position is due 
to retained earnings and new capital issuances. 
European banks profitability measured on a ROE basis is slowly progressing, 
averaging 3.6% in 2014 (up from 2.7% in 2013), still far from what insiders consider 
to be a long term sustainable level5 (range from 10% to 12%). European banks 
estimated cost of equity6 has considerably declined to an average of 9.5% in 
comparison with the levels from 2011 (14.6%), reflecting the lower interest rate 
framework.  
The Spanish Case 
Spain was not one of the top losers of the financial crisis on a GDP basis, seeing 
its output shrink 3.9% in 2009, when the Eurozone contracted by 4.6%. It was, 
though, one among the 5 European countries that needed a bailout in order to 
stabilize the domestic economy. Yields on Spanish bonds reached a peak in 2012 
(7.3%), the height of the banking crisis in the country. 
In the course of the years preceding the credit crunch, total credit outstanding 
increased at a steady 17.09% CAGR, meaning that from 2004 to 2008, the credit 
market in Spain almost doubled in gross terms, with the Corporate & SME 
segment leading the expansion with a 20.49% CAGR. After 2008 the landscape 
changed considerably, with the trend reverting. Gross loan amounts in 2014 
contracted some 24.77% in relation to their 2008 value, representing a CAGR of 
                                                 
5 EBA Risk Assessment Report, June 2015 


































































Figure 35 - Spain Sovereign Yields
Spain 10 Year Yield
Spain 5 Year Yield












































































Figure 33 - Eurozone Inflation and Real 
GDP Growth
Real GDP Growth QoQ
Inflation YoY










































































Figure 34 - Spain Inflation and Real GDP 
Growth
Real GDP Growth QoQ
Inflation YoY
Source: Reuters, OCDE  
 
 








-4.63%. All loan segments saw their value reduced, with the biggest loser being 
Credit Institutions (-8.43% CAGR) followed by Corporate & SME (-6.64% CAGR). 
The Government segment was an exception to this generalized decrease, with an 
expansion of gross loan value at an 11.43% CAGR pace. 
The contraction in loan amounts coincided with the aggravation of NPL ratios: the 
contraction in Spain’s GDP, the increase in the unemployment rate and the crash 
in the real estate prices led to a surge in underperforming loans. The most 
dramatic case was observed in the Corporate & SME segment, which evolved 
from an NPL ratio in 2007 of 0.74% to 18.9% in 2014 (year high in 2013 with 
20.13%), being the Construction and Real Estate segments the most hit (0.72% 
in 2007 against 32.62% in 2014 and 0.53% in 2007 against 36.21% in 2014, 
respectively). The House Purchasing segment also suffered a blow, with an NPL 
ratio of 5.85% in 2014 compared with 0.71% in 2007. 
Interest rates on House Purchase loans and Corporate & SME loans showed a 
similar behaviour throughout the last decade, with an accentuated fall from 2008 
to 2011, with a recuperation up until 2013, only to fall yet again. This behaviour is 
closely tied to the one of the Euribor rates, which comes as a consequence of the 
efforts of monetary policy makers to improve the liquidity in the financial markets 
when banks were dealing with the setbacks of the credit crunch, and as such, 
were holding lending activity back. 
Deposits followed a different trend than loans. There was not a clear contraction 
on the amount of deposits in the Spanish market. From 2004 to 2008, total 
deposits grew at a CAGR of 15.59%, being Term Deposits the segment that most 
contributed to the growth, with a CAGR of 27.29%. In the years following the 
inception of the crisis however, the Deposit value was kept rather constant, around 
the EUR 1.5 tn mark. One way to explain the difference in after-2008 behaviour 
of loans and deposits is, although banks can choose to scale back their credit 
activities on the wake of a wave of a distressed loan book, households (the 
majority of deposit holders, with a share of about 75% in 2014) will not, with a 
good degree of certainty, store their savings under the mattress or channel their 
deposits to international institutions. Bank runs can happen when some institution 
is perceived to be financially damaged in a way that might not guarantee the 
deposits, but the money is just transferred to other bank, being kept in the system. 
Interest rates on Term Deposits also followed the same trend of Euribor rates, 
reaching a peak in 2008 of 5%, subsequently dropping to 2% in 2010. After a 





























































Figure 37 - Spain's average interest rates on 
Loans
House Purchase Corporate & SME
Source: Bank of Spain 



















































Figure 36 - Spain selected NPL Ratios
NPL Ratio Corporate&SME Loans
NPL Ratio House Purchase
NPL Ratio Consumer Loans




























































Figure 38 - Spain's interest rate on Term 
Deposits (new deposits)
Source: Bank of Spain 
 
 








Figures 39 and 40 below compare the evolution of the stock of loans and deposits 
in Spain throughout the last decade. 
 
As a consequence of the loans and deposits’ dynamics, the operating 
performance of credit institutions suffered significant changes when comparing 
the years before the crisis and the ones after the storm had settled.  
Global Interest Income of deposit taking institutions in Spain from 2004 to 2008 
enjoyed a 29.90% CAGR reaching a high of EUR 147.1 bn in 2008, fuelled by a 
CAGR of 31.8% in interest income related to Credit Transactions. Securities’ 
Portfolios related income also contributed to the increase, with a CAGR of 13.14% 
in this period. From 2008 to 2014 the situation reversed completely, with deposit 
taking institutions receiving less interest income at a pace of a -14.66% CAGR 
reaching a low in 2014 of EUR 54.7 bn, as despite the performance of 1.6% CAGR 
from interest generated by Securities’ Portfolios, the -17.43% CAGR on Credit 
Transactions proved to be more relevant in setting the final results for the whole 
of the interest income. These results reveal the consequences of the contraction 
in the credit market and the big plunge in interest rates on 2008. The segmentation 
of interest income between Credit Transactions, Securities’ Portfolios and Other 
has been relatively constant throughout the years leading to 2008 (on average, 
Credit Transactions having an 82.8% share, Securities’ Portfolios 16.2% and 
Other sources a residual 1%). Only after 2008 the share of Credit Transactions 
and Securities’ Portfolio diverged, with the former obtaining an increasing weight 
up until 2009 (89.34%) when the latter stood at 9.03%.  
Regarding the overall Interest Expense for the Spanish deposit taking institutions, 
it followed the same behaviour as interest income, only with higher relative swings 
(pre 2008 it presented a CAGR of 43.36% and after a CAGR of -20.14%). 
All in all, Net Interest Income in 2014 stood at EUR 27.1 bn, the same level as in 
2006. In the past 10 years, deposit taking institutions have been able to post profits 
up until 2011, when an increase of 100% in impairment charges surrendered the 
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FIgure 39 - Spanish Loan Market segmentation (EUR bn)
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Figure 40 - Spanish Deposit Market segmentation (EUR bn) 







































































Figure 41 - Net interest Income in Spain, 
EUR bn








































































Figure 42 - Net Income and Impairments of 
Spain, EUR bn
Impairment Charges Net Income
Source: Bank of Spain 
Source: Bank of Spain 
 
 








totalling EUR 116 bn, which imposed a net loss of EUR 73.7 bn for the whole of 
the deposit taking institutions. Bankia alone posted a EUR 19.2 bn loss, 26% of 
the total. 
Pressured by these figures, Spain requested international aid in 2012. The 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) agreed with the European Commission in 
July 2012 defined a bailout package that granted EUR 100 bn to capitalize the 
financial system of Spain. Of that, EUR 41.3 bn were used. As for the conclusion 
of the program, Spain will bear the principal repayment costs starting on 2022 and 
ending on 2027. The amount of the international aid program that was used was 
in line with the stress test results that were conducted as a part of the MoU: Oliver 
Wyman forecasted a total capital need of EUR 16 to 25 bn in the base scenario 
and EUR 51 to 62 bn in the adverse scenario.  
Legal reforms (Royal Decree Law, August 31 2012) prompted the necessary 
structural reforms to strengthen the financial system. The State was conferred 
more powers to intervene in endangered systemic institutions without 
shareholders or creditors’ approval and more burden sharing mechanisms were 
implemented, with the State having the capability of imposing losses on certain 
debt holders in intervened institutions. 
Regulatory Framework 
The global financial crisis put a spotlight on banks’ fragile risk management 
procedures. It served as a wake-up call for regulators to tighten the grip on 
institutions held to be systemically important for the economy. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision decides on rulings that dictate the 
international standards for the banking sector regulation, comprising capital and 
liquidity control guidelines, along with the implementation of best practices in risk 
management and information disclosures. A review of the then incumbent 
regulation (Basel II) was done in 2010, in good part as a result of the events of 
2008. Basel III was born and its rules were set to be implemented in a phased 
fashion, with full implementation by 2019. 
Basel III aggregates three types of quantitative controls: risk weighted capital 
adequacy ratios, liquidity ratios and a general leverage ratio. 
Risk weighted capital ratios establish that, at any point in time the institution has to 
surpass the thresholds of Common Tier 1 capital being above 4.5%, Tier 1 capital 
above 6% and Total Capital above 8% the risk weighted assets. An additional 
capital conservation buffer of 2.5% (composed of Common Tier 1 capital) is 
required if the institution wants to consider the possibility of paying out dividends. 
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
CET 1 4.50% 4.50% 4.50% 4.50% 4.50%
CT 1 5.50% 6% 6% 6% 6%
Total Capital 8% 8% 8% 8% 8%
Cons. Buffer 0% 0.63% 1.25% 1.88% 2.50%
Count. Buffer [0%;2.5%] [0%;2.5%] [0%;2.5%] [0%;2.5%] [0%;2.5%]
LCR 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
NSFR 100%+ 100%+ 100%+ 100% 100%
Leverage 3%* 3%* 3%* n/a n/a
Figure 44 – Basel 3 implementation schedule 
Source: Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision 







Foreclosed RE & Other
Figure 43 - Oliver Wyman Loss Forecast for 
Spain (2012-2014), EUR bn
Adverse Scenario Base Scenario
Source: Oliver Wyman 
 
 








Also, a countercyclical buffer set between 0% and 2.5% (also composed of Core 
Tier 1 capital) can be imposed on institutions. National authorities have 
discretionary power on the enforcement of this ratio that should be higher when 
the economy faces a credit expansion. With the full implementation of both buffers, 
institutions might face, in an extreme scenario, a minimum Common Tier 1 capital 
of 9.5% of risk weighted assets. 
Liquidity ratios comprise the Liquidity Coverage Ratio, a short term metric used to 
assess the capacity of the institution to face a liquidity shortage (relates high quality 
liquid assets to the risk exposure of net cash outflows), which should be higher 
than 100%. A more structural measure is also object of compliance, the Net Stable 
Funding Ratio, which requires that the available amount of stable funding of the 
institution to be higher than the amount of stable funding it needs. 
The general leverage ratio was designed to weigh on and off balance sheet items 
of capital exposure, in a non-risk adjusted basis. The minimum requirement in test 
up until 2017 is 3%, in 2018 a definitive figure is due to be announced. 
Competitive Positioning 
Bankia’s competitors are financial institutions that make up for a significant share 
of the banking sector in Spain. Bankia sets apart from the competitors by being an 
exclusively Spain oriented bank, and for its State backing. 
Santander 
Santander is the biggest listed bank in Spain by market capitalization and assets. 
Unlike Bankia, it has a strong international presence, with only 14% of its profit 
being attributable to Spain’s operations. Its total Loan Portfolio (net) amounts to 
EUR 734.7 bn with an almost equitable distribution between Commercial Loans 
and Consumer Loans, representing 58% of its assets and securing a 13.5% market 
share in Spain. Its NPL ratio in 2014 stood at 5.19%, a decrease from the 5.61% 
in 2013. Its EUR 1.27 tn Balance Sheet is funded in majority by Deposits (47.9%), 
short term debt (15.5%) and long term debt (16.9%).  
Santander held its ground during the height of the financial crisis in Spain. ROE 
suffered a big blow in 2012 mas managed to stay in positive territory. Tier 1 capital 
did not fall below the regulatory requirements.  
As for the stock market performance, Santander rewarded its shareholders with an 
annualized return of 6.14% since the beginning of 2012 until the present date. 
                                                 


















































































Figure 45 - Santander's Stock Performance, 
EUR 
Source: Bloomberg  
 
 










BBVA is a global institution present in 31 countries across all continents but Africa. 
BBVA’s assets totalled EUR 631.9 bn in 2014, composed in its majority by its net 
loan book (52.4%). It holds a 13.2% market share in loans in Spain . Its asset 
quality increased in 2014, materialized by a non-performing assets ratio of 5.8% 
compared with 6.8% for the year of 2013. 
For the funding structure of the Balance Sheet, counts with deposits amounting to 
46.5% of the assets and debt corresponding to 33.2%. The market share of 
deposits in Spain is 11.3%. 
ROE has been showing an ascending trajectory since 2012 when it was 0.9%, in 
2014 being 5.6%.  
Regarding the performance of BBVA in the stock market, since 2012 to the current 
date, it yielded an annualized return of 9.61%. 
CaixaBank 
CaixaBank holds the last place in the podium of the biggest Spanish banks by 
market capitalization and assets. It has an international presence through the 
equity stakes held in certain international banking institutions. As of 2014 its net 
loans represented 55.7% of its EUR 338.6 bn balance sheet, which granted a 
market share of 15.1% in Spain, making CaixaBank the market leader in lending 
in the country. The exposure of the loan book to the Corporate & SME segment is 
28.8% of the total loans. As for the NPL ratio, it is down to 9.7% in 2014 from 11.7% 
in 2013. 
CaixaBank’s assets are funded mostly by deposits (52.5%), a segment where it is 
also market leader in Spain, with a share of 14.4% in 2014. Debt makes up for 
13.2% of total assets. 
As for profitability, CaixaBank saw its ROE of 2012 barely cross the 0% line at 1%, 
although in 2014 the ratio improved to 2.7%. The bank was cleared in the EBA’s 
stress testing exercise of 2014. 
CaixaBank share offered an annualized return in the period of 2012 to year to date 
of 3.36%. 
Sabadell 
Sabadell is also a major player in the Spanish banking landscape. It is 
internationally focused, counting with branch networks and equity investments key 
















































































Figure 46 - BBVA's Stock Performance, 
EUR
















































































Figure 48 - Sabadell's Stock Performance, 
EUR




















































































Figure 47 - Caixabank's Stock Performance, 
EUR
Source: Bloomberg  
 
 








2014 stood at 12.2%, a decrease from 13.6% on the previous year. The assets are 
funded 59.3% by deposits, while debt amounts to 29.9%. From 2013 to 2014 the 
composition of the deposits changed, with current accounts weighting more than 
before, and the share of term deposits falling, signalling a cheaper funding 
structure. That could help explain the fall in interest expense by 26% in this period, 
and consequent increase of 24.5% in Net Interest Income. 
Profitability wise, ROE is up to 3.7% in 2014, from 1.58% in the previous year. In 
2014, the Core Tier 1 capital ratio was 11.7%. 
Sabadell’s performance in the stock market since 2012 was not what shareholders 
hoped it to be, posting an annualized return of -3.35%. 
Valuation 
For the valuation of Bankia, a discounted cash flow to equity model was employed, 
where the horizon period spans 10 years. For the continuing value, a perpetuity 
with growth rate was used. It was assumed that Bankia was able to increase or 
reduce its Equity so as to comply with the regulatory ratios (estimated total capital 
raising needs of EUR 1.8 bn for the horizon period).  
Income 
Loan Portfolio 
The Loan Portfolio was responsible for over a half of the interest income received 
by Bankia in 2013 and 2014. It is expected that, with the targeting of Corporate & 
SME clients that contribute with higher interest rates and with the forecasted low 
level of sovereign yields, the Loan Portfolio will continue to secure its position as 
the main source of income of Bankia. 
Average interest rates on outstanding loans are expected to start increasing in 3-
4 years, as the picking up of credit concession activity is expected to help higher 
rates on new loans drive the aggregate rates of new and existing loans up. It is 
forecasted that interest rates will gradually work their way up to the levels before 
the crisis struck. Bankia’s NPL ratios are forecasted to converge to Spain’s 
average values for the whole credit market as a result of the balance sheet 
cleansing activities taken part as per the influence of the Restructuring Plan.  
The loan market in Spain is forecasted to start its recovery in the coming 3-4 years 
(as recent data from the Bank of Spain still shows decreasing values for the 
outstanding volumes of loans), helped by the positive outlook for the Spanish 
economy. Bankia, is expected to comply with its Restructuring Plan, meaning the 
market shares for the Corporate & SME segment are forecasted to increase at a 
Source: Bank of Spain, Analyst’s 
estimates  



























































Figure 49 - Spanish Loans Market, EUR bn
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Figure 52 - Bankia's NPL and NPL 
Coverage ratios
Total NPL Ratio H
Total NPL Ratio E
Total NPL Coverage Ratio H


























































Figure 51 - Bankia's average interest rate of 
Loan Portfolio
Average Interest Rate Loan Portfolio H
Average Interest Rate Loan Portfolio E












slow, steady pace, as the task already proved was already proved difficult in the 
previous years. The difference from the past situation is that Bankia faced a much 
more depressed Corporate & SME market, whereas now it is expected to 
encounter a market starting to give signs of a sustained recuperation. 
That way, the bank’s exposure to the Corporate & SME segment is forecasted to 
increase as a share of the total portfolio. 
Bond Portfolio 
The Bond Portfolio holds the second place in the podium of income generating 
activities for Bankia. Overall interest income for the Bond Portfolio is expected to 
decline in the upcoming 3-4 years as a consequence of the low yield environment 
which results in high reinvestment risk, picking up after that, contingent to a 
forecasted longer run growth on yields. It is assumed that the ALCO Portfolio will 
maintain its risk profile, being constituted mainly by Spanish sovereign bonds.  
On a specific note, the last ESM bond held by Bankia matures at the end of 2015, 
and the last interest payment is forecasted to be negligible, as it is indexed to 
Euribor 6M that currently is on negative ground.  
Sareb bonds are also expected to suffer a blow in their contribution to interest 
generation. The 3 year Sareb bond matures at the end of 2015, and is expected to 
be renegotiated on similar terms as the other tranches’ re-negotiations were held, 
that is, the spread over the Euribor 3M is forecasted to significantly fall, causing 
expected lost revenue of EUR 64 mm per year. As past observations on the other 
tranches tell, the first re-negotiation of the spreads is the toughest one for Bankia. 
As such, after this update on the spreads of the 3 year bond, spreads then on out 
are considered to be relatively stable. 
As part of the company’s disclosures for the interest income, there is a line of 
hedging transactions that moves in the opposite direction of interest income. It was 
assumed that these hedging transactions were related to the Bond Portfolio and 
that the interest yielded from these assets are net of these hedging results. 
Net Fees 
Fees are assumed to be connected to the business level of a given bank. In the 
case of Bankia, for fee income the business level was estimated through the total 
amount of gross loans and gross customer deposits, the assets and liabilities that 
were considered to be fee earning. The fee income was calculated as having the 
same growth rate as the said balance sheet items. 
As for the fee expense, the same rationale was followed. The balance sheet items 
used as a proxy for the payment of fees were the financial assets held for trading. 
Source: Analyst’s estimates 
*Net of derivative transactions 














































































Figure 55 - Bankia's net fees, EUR mm





Figure 54 - Bankia's Bond Portfolio 
composition, EUR bn
Non ALCO Bonds & Other E
ALCO Bonds E
Sareb Bonds E
Source: Analyst’s estimates 
 
 









Disposal of Assets 
Bankia is following a policy of disinvestment on non-core assets, recognised under 
“Non-Current Assets Held for Sale”. A specific case is the City National Bank of 
Florida sold on October 2015 that yielded a net gain of about EUR 117 mm. Other 
disposable groups were considered to yield the same premium over their net value. 
The estimated book equity value for these groups is EUR 661.4 mm, suggesting 
that the room for potential losses or gains is not very relevant in broad valuation 
terms. As for the case of foreclosed assets that are still being in the process of 
sale, a small net loss was considered.  
These transactions do not pose a significant impact on Bankia’s valuation, since 
the balance sheet cleansing is already running from 3 years now, meaning that the 




Deposits represent the majority of the interest expense of Bankia. Customer 
Deposits made up for 63.85% of the whole of the deposits in 2014, and cost an 
average interest rate of 1.12%. This level of interest rate is not expected to subsist 
in the long term, mainly due to the importance for Bankia in capturing Savings 
Accounts and Fixed Term Deposits (they amounted for EUR 82.1 bn in funding in 
2014, corresponding to 35% of the Asset value). Bankia’s dependence on these 
funds is expected to play a role against the low interest rate environment and so a 
conservative increase in these deposits’ segments interest rates is expected, 
which in turn would lever up the average interest rate of the customer deposits, 
forecasted to start increasing in the next couple of years.  
It is considered that the level of the Deposits in the Spanish economy continues to 
follow its trend since the beginning of the century. Term Deposits, the class that 
was most affected on the wake of the financial crisis is expected to slowly regain 
its attractiveness to customers, as the confidence in a bailed out financial system 
is re-obtained.  
Deposits from Central Banks are expected to decrease in the coming years, as 
Bankia returned to the unsecured debt capital markets in 2014, a step forward on 
the bank’s independence from central bank emergency funding. 
Bankia’s market shares on deposits are not expected to change significantly from 
the values observed in the past years 
Source:  Analyst’s estimates  
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Figure 59 - Bankia's Mortgage loans, EUR 
bn
Mortgages H Mortgages E

























































Figure 58 - Bankia's average Customer 
Deposits' interest rate
Average Customer Deposits' Interest Rate H
Average Customer Deposits' Interest Rate E








Figure 56 - Bankia's Expense composition
Deposits Debt
Administrative Depreciation














Bankia currently holds debt funding in the form of senior unsecured bonds, 
subordinated bonds and mortgage covered bonds.  
It is prospected that Bankia is able to cover any funding needs in the future with 
new issues of senior unsecured bonds or mortgage covered bonds, securities that 
compose the “Marketable Debt Securities” line in the company’s disclosures. 
Bankia had successful placements of this type of debt in 2014 and 2015. Although 
the bank’s plan is to focus on business lending, Bankia is expected to hold a stable 
level of mortgage loans, which are expected to perform better (lower NPL ratios), 
as the Spanish economy is expected to continue its recovery, what levers Bankia’s 
ability to issue mortgage covered bonds.  
According to the company’s disclosures, a significant amount of the interest 
expense is compensated by hedging instruments, being this value in 2013 96.85% 
of the interest expense with debt securities, and in 2014 it actually was higher than 
the interest expense by 1.24%. As such, the interest rate assumed for the interest 
expense related to these securities is considered to be net of the hedging activities. 
As such, as a basis for the forecasted interest rate, it was assumed that these 
hedging income was related to these debt securities and that the interest expense 
would be net of such income. A spread over Euribor 6M (the index rate of the ICO 
bonds that Bankia issued) was used to calculate the rate. 
The steep drop in the historical period versus the forecasted recovery is explained 
by the substitution of Central Bank deposits as a source of funds by this type of 
debt securities. 
Administrative Expense 
Administrative Expenses covers staff costs and other general supporting activities’ 
related costs (as IT, office supplies and advertising). As for staff costs, Bankia in 
its Restructuring Plan agreed to personnel layoffs that were already accomplished 
in full by 2014 (which led to a decrease of 28.1% in employees and 27.1% in staff 
costs). As a consequence, staff costs are assumed to be constant here on out, 
only to be updated according to inflation. Other administrative costs are also 
considered to follow the same behaviour of staff costs, growing at the pace of 
inflation.  
Depreciation and Amortization 
The Restructuring Plan also envisages the scaling back of Bankia’s branch 
network, with the goal set out being reached by year end 2014, representing a drop 
Source: Company Data, Analyst’s 
estimates 
Source: Company Data, Analyst’s 
estimates.  




































































Figure 60 - Bankia's Marletable Debt 
Securities, EUR bn
Marketable Debt Securities H

































































Figure 61 - Bankia's Deposits from Central 
Banks, EUR bn
Central Bank Deposits H
Central Bank Deposits E
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Figure 62 - Bankia's Staff Costs, EUR mm




























Figure 63 - Bankia's Tangible&Intagible 















of 0.62% from 2012 to 2014 in the tangible assets value, even though the number 
of branches was reduced in 35.64% during the same period. In light of the 
resilience of the tangible assets’ value, it was assumed that Bankia pursues a 
maintenance capex policy, investing a percentage of the assets’ depreciation. The 
same rule was applied to the modelling of intangible assets.  
Impairment Losses & Provisions 
Impairment losses on financial assets are expected to decrease substantially as a 
result of the improvement on credit quality. NPL ratios are forecasted to converge 
to national levels pre-crisis, especially mortgage lending, which the amount of 
credit is forecasted to increase due to low rates and house prices that start to give 
signs of a recovery. The asset disposal program that Bankia has in course is 
thought to contribute also for a decrease in this type of expense in the years to 
come.  
Tax Expense 
For the tax expense, it was assumed that the statutory corporate tax rate would be 
constant at 30% throughout all periods, as ruled in the Law 27/2014 of 27 
November.  
As a result of the net losses registered in the years of 2011 and 2012, Bankia 
accumulated a substantial amount of tax assets in its balance sheet. Only about 
half of the Balance Sheet value for this assets is considered to be monetized (circa 
EUR 4 bn). For the purpose of calculating the tax expense, it was considered that 
these tax assets (the ones that can be monetized)  would serve as tax breaks when 
the bank posts a positive profit before tax, or they would be reinforced if the was 
to present a net loss in a given period of the analysis.  
As these tax assets are a consequence of past credit impairments, the regulatory 
framework of Basel III demands a deduction from equity in the calculation of the 
regulatory capital, resulting in the need for more equity injection. This deduction is 
capped as 10% of the equity value of the bank. 
The current expiration period for the usage of tax assets in Spain is 18 years, but 
Bankia is expected to use its tax assets in the course of the next 10 years. 
Cost of Equity 
To derive Bankia’s cost of equity, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) was 
used, as it is the industry’s practice.  
With its flotation, Bankia opened its operations to retail and institutional investors 
willing to partake in the bank’s business. These investors are assumed to be able 
Figure 66 – Parameters for Bankia’s Cost 
of Equity Calculation 












Figure 65 - Tax Assets evolution, EUR mm
Total Tax Assets E Monetizable Tax Assets E




Market Risk Premium 5.75%
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to invest in whichever geographies, sectors and companies as they most find fit, 
meaning that they hold a substantially diversified portfolio. As such, instead of 
using benchmark interest rates and indices specific of Spain, broader benchmarks 
were used. The specificities of Spain, and the banking sector should be reflected 
in the estimation of the cash flows. As such, the benchmark for the risk free interest 
rate was considered to be the German 10 year sovereign bond. The proxy for the 
market portfolio chosen was the EuroStoxx 600.  
To better the consistency of the Beta estimate, the calculation of the Betas using 
a rolling period of 2 years of daily data was employed, enabling the comparison of 
the evolution of the Betas. A 95% confidence interval for the Betas was also 
calculated. The graph below shows the results of such analysis. 
 
As it is observable, there are two clear periods in the sample where the Betas 
display significant differences in their 95% confidence intervals: before and after 
April 2015. As the latter period has a narrower confidence interval, this statistically 
means that with a 95% degree of certainty, we are able to provide a clearer 
estimate of the Beta in this period than in the former. In light of this result, the Beta 
considered for Bankia was the average value of the Betas from April 2015 until the 
most recent data point. The resulting value is 1.17. 
As for the Market Risk Premium, it was used the value calculated by NYU professor 
Aswath Damodaran for a mature equity market as of January 2015, as this is the 
source used by the European Banking Authority (EBA) on their own calculations 
of cost of equity. The value of the Market Risk Premium considered is then 5.75%. 
The resulting Cost of Equity using all of the aforementioned parameters is 7.36%, 
lower than the EBA calculated average Cost of Equity for a selection of European 
banks (9.5%). 
Results & Sensitivity Analysis 
With the aforementioned considerations and assuming that Bankia is to maintain 










Figure 68 - Bankia's Beta and 95% Confidence Intervals
Beta
Figure 69 – Bankia’s top 10 Shareholders 
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be covered by Common Tier 1 Equity, so as to comply with the other regulatory 
requirements), together with a smooth increase of the Risk Weighted Assets as a 
percentage of total Assets, to account for the increase in risk in the Loan Portfolio 
refocusing on Corporate & SME, Bankia’s projected share price as of 2016 year 
end is EUR 0.945, offering an upside of -6.69% related to the current price8 of EUR 
1.013 This value includes a perpetual growth rate of 1% for the continuation value, 
figure derived from the CAGR of the aggregate financial institutions’ assets in 
Spain since 2000. 
Below, figure 70 demonstrates the variations in the fair value of Bankia, according 
to investors with different costs of equity and different views on the growth potential 
of the bank. 
 
The table shows that the possibility of positive upside for Bankia is reserved to 
situations where the cost of equity for a bank is unrealistically low (even 7.36% can 
be considered low if compared with the 9.50% average calculated by the EBA), or 
if it a considered a growth rate more in line with the projected average GDP growth 
rate for Spain in the upcoming years (2.25% according to the IMF).  
Relative Valuation 
To triangulate the valuation result of the Flow to Equity (FTE) method, a 
comparison between the consensus values for the P/E and P/B multiples of 
comparable companies for the estimated 2016 year end is conducted. The 
comparable companies chosen were Santander, BBVA, CaixaBank, Sabadell, 
Bankinter, Liberbank and Popular, the biggest listed Spanish banks by market 
capitalization. 
On a P/E basis, Bloomberg’s consensus estimates (current share price related to 
the estimated EPS for 2016) place Bankia on the 3rd quartile in 2016, with a multiple 
of 12.26. This suggests an overvaluation of Bankia in relation with its peers, with a 
negative outlook on future earnings (current P/E is lower than the estimated 2016 
P/E). The bearish outlook for the earnings of Bankia contrasts with the average 
                                                 
8Share price as of 06/01/2016 
Figure 70 - Sensitivity Analysis Table
0.40% 0.60% 0.80% 1.00% 1.20% 1.40% 1.60%
3.76% 1.995 2.102 2.223 2.362 2.523 2.711 2.933
4.96% 1.426 1.478 1.536 1.598 1.668 1.745 1.832
6.16% 1.099 1.128 1.160 1.194 1.231 1.271 1.315
7.36% 0.887 0.905 0.924 0.945 0.967 0.991 1.016
8.56% 0.739 0.751 0.764 0.777 0.792 0.807 0.823
9.76% 0.631 0.639 0.648 0.657 0.667 0.677 0.688














P/E Current 2015 E 2016 E
Bankia 12.05 12.13 12.26
Santander 11.04 10.34 9.88
BBVA 14.14 15.21 10.82
CaixaBank 17.37 15.94 11.77
Sabadell 11.92 14.04 10.75
Bankinter 16.89 16.11 13.94
Liberbank 7.89 9.37 11.24
Popular 18.76 22.15 13.13
1st Quartile 11.70 11.68 10.80
Median 13.09 14.63 11.50
3rd Quartile 17.01 15.99 12.48
Average 13.76 14.41 11.72













expectation of increasing earnings for the comparable companies in 2016 (average 
current P/E is higher than average P/E for 2016). 
The comparable metric resulting from the FTE valuation is coincidentally also 
12.26, what means that the consensus view on Bankia’s 2016 EPS is supported 
by the FTE model as well.  
As for the P/B multiple, Bankia is placed on the fourth quartile, suggesting a clearer 
overvaluation than the one using P/E. Comparing the P/B multiple estimated for 
2016 and the current one there is an implied forecasted increase in the book value 
of equity per share. In the FTE model, the book value per share in 2016 is 
considered to decrease from its 2015 estimated value of EUR 1.048 to 1.043 in 
2016. 
The FTE valuation comparable multiple for this P/B is 0.97, compared with the 
Bloomberg consensus of 1.02, suggesting that in the FTE valuation, the 
assumptions of regulatory capital compliance are stronger. 
This quick analysis indicates that investors might be overpaying for Bankia in 2016, 
if its valuation is currently assumed to be correct. However, looking at the multiples 
using the FTE model’s target price for 2016 (11.44 for P/E and 0.97 for P/B), it is 
arguable that the multiples are poised to be reviewed in low, given Bankia’s current 
projected overvaluation, which in the end can counter the effect of overpaying for 
Bankia’s stock to a certain extent. 
Risk Analysis 
Although the expected path of macroeconomic and other non-controlled variables 
by Bankia are reflected in the presented valuation, there are considerable risks of 
deviations from those estimations that have the capability of the resulting target 
price.  
Spanish Economy 
The Spanish economy is on a recovery track, and is expected to maintain its 
growth for the next couple of years, averaging an annual GDP growth of 2.25% 
from 2015 to 2020 according to the IMF. Albeit the structurally high unemployment 
rate, some positive changes have been observed in the labour market, through the 
moderate increase in wages. 
After the peak of the crisis, credit concession is still rather sluggish, even with a 
more resiliently backed banking sector as a result of the restructuring packages 
and international assistance to banks.  
P/B Current 2015 E 2016 E
Bankia 1.06 1.07 1.02
Santander 0.83 0.81 0.76
BBVA 1.08 1.00 0.95
CaixaBank 0.79 0.80 0.78
Sabadell 0.75 0.74 0.71
Bankinter 1.63 1.63 1.53
Liberbank 0.59 0.61 0.60
Popular 0.56 0.55 0.54
1st Quartile 0.71 0.71 0.69
Median 0.81 0.80 0.77
3rd Quartile 1.07 1.02 0.97
Average 0.91 0.90 0.86
 











Figure 73 - Spain Real GDP Growth












The ECB’s program of Quantitative Easing could be a source of disruption in the 
markets and investors are already speculating about the existence of asset 
bubbles, mainly on the bond market. If the high liquidity environment ends up 
creating an uncontrolled boom that is deemed to bust, then the banking sector 
could be one of the most affected. 
The recent election of the 20th of December 2015, where no party managed to 
secure a majority in the parliament is a major source of instability. The parties are 
currently in talks for the new government formation, but a rather long path of 
negotiations is expected. The possibility of early elections is also a scenario to take 
into account. 
Lawsuits 
Bankia went public on the 20th of July of 2011, raising EUR 1.23 bn from 
institutional investors and EUR 1.85 bn from retail investors. One year later it was 
receiving state aid to face its financial troubles. As of today, Bankia’s shareholders 
who entered the position in the IPO have lost 97.39% of the investment. 
As soon as 2012, the disastrous performance of the share in the stock market 
prompted retail shareholders to file civil complaints against the bank. One of the 
arguments is that regulatory information disclosures of Bankia and BFA were not 
reflecting the truth of the bank’s financial situation at the time of the equity sale. 
What was a small profit in the original annual report for 2011 turned out to be a 
EUR 7 bn loss when the accounts were reviewed. The claims are now in pre-trial 
phase. 
On the 23rd of December 2015, BFA announced a EUR 1 bn provision for the IPO 
lawsuits (the civil claims amount to around EUR 820 mm as of December 2015, 
indicating that BFA is being overcautious on the matter). Bankia’s share of the 
provision is EUR 736 mm, of which EUR 312 mm were already provisioned. So, 
for the accounts of 2015, a further EUR 424 mm was considered as provision 
expense. 
The end result of this situation is not clear at this stage, nor is it clear if Bankia 
would be required to face the costs by itself alone. However, the maximum before 
tax loss to Bankia should be around EUR 1.85 bn, what would represent the 
reimbursement of all the capital contribution of retail investors in the IPO9, and 
what was approved by the FROB as the maximum amount of provisions for this 
lawsuit. This very unlikely scenario, on which Bankia would support all the cost by 
                                                 







Figure 74 - Spanish Elections Results, % of 
Parliament Seats
PP PSOE Podemos Ciudadanos Other
Source: Financial Times 
 
 








itself, would impact the forecasted share price by a decrease from EUR 0.945, to 
EUR 0.863 (a decrease of 8.69%), if the losses are to be registered in full by 2017. 
Sareb 
Sareb has the mission of successfully disposing the transferred assets to its 
balance sheet during its limited lifetime, which is expected to end in November 
2027, all the while maintaining a viable business proposition so as to reduce 
taxpayers’ exposure to further state intervention. 
While the bonds Sareb issued as the payment for the transferred assets, of which 
Bankia currently holds an amount of EUR 18 bn, are state guaranteed, the fact that 
one of Sareb’s missions is not to impose costs to taxpayers opens the possibility 
of losses arising to Bankia, in the case of Sareb not being able to organically face 
its debt obligations. 
As of the end of 2014, the securities issued by Sareb in exchange for the 
transferred assets amounted to EUR 46 bn, which corresponds to about 90% of 
the funding for its assets. Sareb only counts with 2 full years of operations, but the 
results are not reassuring for the prospect of full debt repayment. 
It posted a net loss of EUR 260.5 mm in 2013 and in 2014 the earnings were again 
negative, this time by EUR 584.7mm (boosted by impairments in its already non-
performing assets), meaning the operations are not yet yielding the desired 
outcome. The success of Sareb is contingent to the developments in the real estate 
market, as the transferred assets are properties in foreclosure and real estate 
loans. If house prices do not rise substantially in the coming years, the danger of 
continuing to register impairment losses and net losses on the disposal of assets 
is expected to materialize and continue to compromise Sareb’s business viability. 
Sareb managed to conduct a cash repayment of the bonds in 2013 (EUR 1.4 bn) 
and 2014 (EUR 2.9 bn) that was financed primarily through available cash reserves 
that were raised in the inception of the institution (EUR 3.8 bn) and with a cash 
generation of around EUR 1 bn in 2013. Sareb closed 2014 with a cash reserve of 
EUR 2.9 bn, just about the necessary to keep a debt repayment of EUR 3 bn per 
year, what would be needed to fully repay these bonds in 15 years, the lifetime of 
Sareb. 
Sareb’s cash generating activities did not yet prove to be any good. If the company 
starts feeling pressure on the cash repayment of these bonds, it might be prompted 
to fire sale its assets, bringing down prospected gains on what is already expected 
to impose great difficulty in generating gains. Raising more debt or equity from 
private investors seems difficult given the financials of the company. 
 
 








Which means that, losses are expected. The question should be who are to bear 
the losses: the investors (as Bankia), the Spanish State? The uncertainty involving 
this matter is extremely high, as it is a problem that is expected to unfold in the 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 4 – Selected Ratios 
 
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 E 2016 F 2017 F 2018 F 2019 F 2020 F 2021 F 2022 F 2023 F 2024 F 2025 F
Net Interest Income 2,481 3,089 2,425 2,927 2,318 2,229 2,263 2,153 2,212 2,052 1,865 2,101 2,281 2,542 2,599
Net Fees 998 992 935 948 940 964 972 985 1,003 1,027 1,045 1,076 1,096 1,117 1,141
Other Income and Expense (net) 307 -71 122 134 134 134 134 134 136 137 138 139 140 141 142
Gross Income 3,786 4,010 3,482 4,009 3,392 3,327 3,369 3,273 3,351 3,215 3,048 3,315 3,517 3,801 3,882
Administrative Expense -1,920 -2,017 -1,729 -1,586 -1,578 -1,589 -1,608 -1,632 -1,657 -1,682 -1,707 -1,732 -1,758 -1,785 -1,812
Depreciation & Amortization -246 -276 -175 -156 -191 -181 -171 -162 -154 -147 -140 -134 -128 -123 -118
Net Provisions -157 -1,832 -180 -208 -549 -138 -124 -123 -121 -120 -119 -118 -117 -115 -114
Net Impairment Losses on Financial Assets -3,954 -18,932 -1,249 -950 -614 -460 -349 -236 -240 -249 -252 -262 -269 -274 -279
Net Operating Income -2,491 -19,047 147 1,108 460 960 1,117 1,121 1,179 1,018 830 1,069 1,245 1,503 1,559
Impairment Losses on Other Assets -304 -782 -18 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -6 -5 -5 -5 -5 -5 -5
Gains on Disposal of Non-Current Assets Held for 
Sale & Disc. Operations -1,575 -2,361 2 -190 37 -2 52 -1 -27 -27 -27 0 0 0 0
Profit Before Tax -4,370 -22,189 131 912 490 952 1,163 1,114 1,146 985 797 1,064 1,240 1,498 1,554
Tax Expense 0 0 0 -226 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -466
P&L from Discountinued Operations 0 0 117 85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net Income (Before Dividends) -4,370 -22,189 248 771 490 952 1,163 1,114 1,146 985 797 1,064 1,240 1,498 1,088
Source: Company Data, Analyst's estimates
2016 F 2017 F 2018 F 2019 F 2020 F 2021 F 2022 F 2023 F 2024 F 2025 F
Net Income (After Dividends) 742 907 869 894 768 622 830 967 1,169 848
(-) Changes in Loans and Receivables 4,733 -457 1,518 2,312 4,449 1,716 5,034 3,643 2,745 2,565
(-) Changes in Other Assets (including Tax Assets) -4,356 -4,127 -2,909 -2,412 -262 235 365 358 234 1,003
(+) Changes in Tax Assets -286 -349 -334 -344 -296 -239 -319 -372 -449 0
(+) Changes in Customer Deposits 740 786 1,306 1,357 1,375 2,756 1,995 2,032 2,069 2,667
(+) Changes in Other Deposits -5,110 -1,919 -795 -748 -1,336 -1,284 -1,235 -1,188 -1,143 -1,100
(+) Changes in Other Liabilities 4,804 -3,352 -2,251 -1,012 3,893 70 4,298 2,610 1,958 1,792
(+) Dividends 209 256 245 252 217 175 234 273 330 239
Cash Flow to Equity 723 912 431 499 434 148 404 321 953 879
Source: Company Data, Analyst's estimates
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 E 2016 F 2017 F 2018 F 2019 F 2020 F 2021 F 2022 F 2023 F 2024 F 2025 F
ROE -52.59% -705.52% 15.27% 6.46% 7.45% 7.90% 9.72% 9.21% 9.23% 7.76% 6.12% 7.94% 8.95% 10.57% 7.59%
ROA -2.03% -6.61% 0.15% 0.32% 0.41% 0.44% 0.54% 0.53% 0.55% 0.47% 0.37% 0.49% 0.56% 0.66% 0.47%
Cost to Income 57.22% 57.18% 54.71% 43.46% 52.13% 53.19% 52.81% 54.82% 54.03% 56.86% 60.59% 56.30% 53.64% 50.20% 49.71%
Loans to Deposits 100.96% 76.40% 72.92% 74.86% 78.98% 84.44% 84.78% 85.51% 86.70% 89.65% 89.91% 92.78% 94.65% 95.86% 96.55%
NPL Ratio 7.67% 12.91% 14.63% 12.89% 12.75% 12.94% 11.89% 11.90% 11.58% 10.69% 10.23% 9.86% 8.72% 8.72% 8.72%
Total Capital Ratio 8.50% 9.80% 10.80% 13.20% 12.50% 12.50% 12.50% 13.00% 13.00% 13.00% 13.00% 13.00% 13.00% 13.00% 13.00%
P/E 14.70 12.19 11.44 9.26 10.00 10.00 12.04 15.79 12.33 11.10 9.22 13.64
P/B 0.90 0.93 0.91 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.93 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.97 1.03
Source: Company Data, Reuters, Analyst's estimates
 
 








Disclosures and Disclaimer 
 
Research Recommendations 
Buy Expected total return (including dividends) of more than 15% over a 12-month 
period. 
Hold Expected total return (including dividends) between 0% and 15% over a 12-month 
period. 
Sell Expected negative total return (including dividends) over a 12-month period. 
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